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INTRODUCTION TO AMICI CURIAE BRIEF IN 
YOUNG V. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. 
 
Deborah L. Brake* and Joanna L. Grossman** 
Over thirty years ago in these pages, law professor and feminist legal 
scholar Wendy W. Williams famously cautioned feminists that “if we can’t 
have it both ways we need to think carefully about which way we want to 
have it.”1  When she wrote those words, the feminist and women’s rights 
advocacy communities were split about whether the newly-enacted 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act should walk the path of equal treatment, 
requiring for pregnancy only the same level of treatment as other 
conditions similarly affecting work, or take an accommodationist, non-
comparative approach to pregnancy, recognizing its distinctive significance 
for women’s work and reproductive lives.  With the small exception of 
permitting some non-comparative accommodations for pregnancy-related 
disabilities, the PDA has hewed to the equal treatment model.2  And yet, 
despite that model’s promise, the intervening three decades of litigation in 
the lower courts have not been kind to the PDA, nor to pregnant women. 
On December 3, 2014, the Supreme Court heard argument in Young v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., the most important pregnancy discrimination 
case to reach the Court in a quarter century.3  The case raises crucial 
questions about the meaning and scope of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act (PDA) of 1978,4 a law passed to eradicate longstanding employer 
policies that excluded pregnant women from the workforce, exempted them 
from generally available leave and insurance benefits, or otherwise made it 
difficult for them to maintain labor force attachments through the period of 
pregnancy and childbirth.  The Act emerged as a response to the Supreme 
Court’s inability to recognize such policies as discriminatory; in a pair of 
 
     *Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh. I am grateful for the 
assistance of Donae Minor (J.D. expected 2015, University of Pittsburgh School of Law), recipient of a 
Derrick Bell Research Fellowship, for her work on this introduction and on the brief itself. 
     **Sidney & Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law 
at Hofstra University. 
 1 Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 196 (1982). 
 2 See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
 3 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
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cases in the 1970s, the Court held that pregnancy discrimination was not a 
form of sex discrimination under either the Equal Protection Clause5 or 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6  The PDA was designed to 
override the latter ruling.7  In addition to declaring pregnancy 
discrimination a form of sex-based discrimination, the PDA includes a 
second clause requiring employers to treat pregnant workers the same as 
other workers with a “similar ability or inability to work.”8 
In the cases that reached the Supreme Court after the enactment of the 
PDA, the Court interpreted the statute broadly to give it the effect Congress 
intended.  In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., the 
Court held that the guarantee of equal treatment applied to the pregnant 
spouses of male employees who were covered by the employer’s health 
insurance.9  In California Federal Savings v. Guerra, the Court held that 
the second clause’s promise of identical treatment with comparable 
workers was in fact a floor not a ceiling on the benefits for pregnant 
workers; as a result, it did not preempt a state law’s more favorable 
treatment of pregnancy-related disability.10  And finally, more recently, in 
UAW v. Johnson Controls, the Court ruled that it was a violation of the 
PDA for a battery manufacturing plant to exclude pregnant or fertile 
women from jobs with high levels of lead exposure.11 
In each of these cases, the Court was mindful of the PDA’s overarching 
purpose—to facilitate women’s inclusion and advancement in the 
workplace despite their distinctive role in the reproductive process.  Yet, in 
a series of cases beginning almost two decades ago, lower federal courts 
have violated the spirit, and in some cases the direct language, of these 
precedents when considering the validity of light-duty policies that grant 
alternative assignments to some workers with temporary disability, but not 
to pregnant workers with comparable restrictions.  In Reeves v. Swift 
Transportation Co., for example, the Sixth Circuit held valid a policy that 
granted light duty to truck drivers who were injured on the job, but refused 
it to all other workers with temporary disability.12  The plaintiff was a 
 
 5 See Gedulgig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974). 
 6 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 7 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”). 
 8 Id. (“[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated 
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit 
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work[.]”). 
 9 See 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983). 
 10 See 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987). 
 11 See 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991). In a more recent case, AT&T v. Hulteen, the Court took a hyper 
technical view of the PDA in ruling that current female retirees could continue to be penalized in terms 
of pension credits for maternity leaves they took before the PDA was enacted—and before the company 
was forced to give the same credit to such leaves as it gave to other temporary disability leaves.  556 
U.S. 701, 716 (2009). 
 12 446 F.3d 637, 638 (6th Cir. 2006). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 
68 WOMEN’S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 36 
pregnant woman with a lifting restriction who was fired after being told 
that the company had no light work for her to do.13  The court concluded 
that the company’s light-duty policy was valid, however, because it was 
“pregnancy blind” and not a pretext for discrimination.14  The Eleventh and 
Fifth Circuits likewise upheld light-duty policies that drew similar 
“pregnancy-blind” distinctions between workers eligible for such 
assignments and those not eligible.15  The Seventh and Fourth Circuits 
followed several years later with similar rulings.16 
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling is the one currently pending in the Supreme 
Court and for which the amicus curiae brief below was submitted.  It raises 
the same issue as previous cases, but on even more egregious facts and 
with even more dire consequences given recent changes to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, as the brief explains. 
Peggy Young was an “air driver” for United Parcel Service (UPS), 
meaning she drove a route delivering packages that arrived by air rather 
than ground and, for that reason, were typically lighter.17  When she 
became pregnant, she was instructed by her doctor not to lift more than 
twenty pounds.18  UPS’s policy allowed light-duty assignments to be 
granted to three classes of drivers: (1) those injured on the job; (2) those 
who have a disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act; and 
(3) those who are not eligible to work as a CDL driver for medical or other 
reasons such as a suspended license.19 But UPS would not accommodate a 
pregnant woman with a lifting restriction because she was not covered by 
the company’s light-duty policy.20 The record in Young showed that UPS 
had accommodated drivers for lifting restrictions that were even more 
severe than Peggy Young’s and for injuries that were not incurred on the 
job, but were sufficient to preclude CDL eligibility.21 
Because women with pregnancy-related disability do not fall into any 
of these categories,22 UPS permits them to “‘continue working as long as 
they wanted to during their pregnancies, unless and until the employee 
presented a doctor’s note or other medical certification that she had a 
 
13Id. at 638-39. 
14Id. at 642. 
15See Spivey v. Beverly Enters. Inc., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 
138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998). 
16See Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011); Young v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013). 
17707 F.3d at 440. 
18 Id. 
19Id. at 441. 
20 Id. 
21Brief for Petitioner, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-2078), 
2013 WL 93132, at *4-*9. 
22The ADA has been consistently interpreted to exclude normal pregnancy as a covered disability.  See 
Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (noting that “the majority of 
federal courts hold that pregnancy-related complications do not constitute a disability under the ADA”). 
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restriction that rendered her unable to perform the essential functions of the 
job.’”23  If unable to work, pregnant drivers will be granted a leave of 
absence.24  Young sought and received several short-term leaves of absence 
as she went through three rounds of in vitro fertilization.25  When she 
finally became pregnant during the third round, her doctor wrote a note 
recommending that she lift no more than twenty pounds during the first 
half of her pregnancy and no more “than 10 pounds thereafter.”26  After 
some back-and-forth between Young and various supervisors at UPS about 
whether the note imposed a “restriction” or only a “recommendation,” the 
company decided that it could not allow her to continue working since she 
was not capable of performing the lifting described in the list of essential 
job functions for her position.27  Young had already used up all available 
medical leave, so she was put on a leave of absence with no pay and no 
medical coverage.28  She returned to work two months after giving birth in 
2007.29 
 Young filed a lawsuit alleging sex and pregnancy discrimination, as 
well as race and disability discrimination.30  The court rejected Young’s 
argument that it facially discriminated against pregnant employees by 
excluding pregnancy from eligibility for light-duty assignments.31  Because 
the policy is “pregnancy-blind” and offers accommodations on the basis of 
“gender-neutral criteria,” the court refused to treat the policy as facially 
discriminatory or as raising an inference of pregnancy discrimination.32  
The court then applied McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and concluded 
that Young did not establish that she met the fourth element – that a 
“similarly situated employee” was treated differently.33 Young argued that 
UPS accommodated a wide range of temporary physical disabilities from 
high blood pressure and diabetes to drunk driving convictions.34  UPS 
argued, and the appellate court agreed, that Young could not use anyone 
who was eligible for ADA accommodation or had lost their legal ability to 
drive as a comparator because they were not sufficiently similar in their 
ability or inability to work. 35 There is no similarity, in the court’s view, 
between a driver who suffers “from a legal obstacle to their operation of a 
vehicle” and a woman whose pregnancy poses “a physical impairment that 
 
 23 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *2 (D. Md. Fen. 14, 2011). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at *3-*4. 
 26 Id. at *4. 
 27 Id. at *5. 
 28 Id. at *5-*6. 
 29 Id. at *6. 
 30 Id. at *11-*12. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at *12-*15. 
 34 Id. at *14-*15. 
 35 Id. at *12-*15. 
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stymied her ability to lift.”36  The court also dismissed with little discussion 
the notion that an ADA-eligible employee could be an appropriate 
comparator for a Young.37  By eliminating a wide-range of employees to 
serve as comparators, the court effectively made it impossible for Young to 
prove that the second clause of the PDA was violated by UPS’s refusal of 
her light-duty request. 
 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling as 
well as its reasoning.38  We argue in the brief that this reasoning effectively 
undercuts the second clause of the PDA, rendering it a dead letter.  In 
explaining why the decision below is incompatible with the theory 
underlying the PDA, we rely heavily on the vibrant new feminist legal 
scholarship on pregnancy discrimination and the PDA.  Part of our goal in 
the brief is to connect the insights from this scholarship to the issues in this 
case.  By integrating this scholarship and applying it in a new way, the 
brief itself contributes to the legal scholarship on the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, bridging the gap between theory and practice.39 
The case is one of the most important gender discrimination cases to 
reach the Court in many years.  With women now comprising half the 
workforce,40 and most women becoming pregnant during their working 
lives, the likelihood that a woman will face a conflict at some point 
between work and pregnancy is very high.  The majority of women work 
during pregnancy and return to the workforce following their pregnancy.41 
“For example, two-thirds of women who had their first child between 2006 
and 2008 worked during [their] pregnancy, and [eighty-eight] percent of 
these first-time mothers worked into their last trimester.”42 For many 
women, the short-term physical effects of pregnancy will at some point 
conflict with the demands of their job.43 
The nature of the conflict varies by the particular job and the 
progression of the pregnancy, but such conflicts often include lifting and 
 
 36 Id. at *13. 
 37 Id. at *19-*20. 
 38 Young, 707 F.3d at 439. 
 39 Cf. Emily M.S. Houh, Toward Praxis, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 905 (2006). 
 40 See U.S. CONGRESS JOINT ECON. COMM., WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY 2010: 25 YEARS OF 
PROGRESS BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 1 (2010), available at  
http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=8be22cb0-8ed0-4a1a-841b-aa91dc55fa81; 
see also Full Transcript: Obama’s 2014 State of the Union Address, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-obamas-2014-state-of-the-union-
address/2014/01/28/e0c93358-887f-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html. 
 41 NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE PREGNANT WORKERS FAIRNESS ACT: MAKING ROOM FOR 
PREGNANCY ON THE JOB 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnantworkersfairnessfactsheet_w_bill_number.pdf 
[hereinafter MAKING ROOM FOR PREGNANCY]. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Joanna L. Grossman, The Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Act: Accommodating the Needs of 
Pregnant Working Women, VERDICT (May 11, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/05/11/the-
pregnant-workers-fairness-act. 
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standing restrictions, the need for more frequent breaks, and scheduling 
adjustments for medical appointments and sick leave.44 Much of the time, 
such conflicts can be resolved with minor accommodations, which are 
often cost-efficient and simple to administer.45  Nevertheless, employers 
too often have blatantly refused to provide accommodations to pregnant 
women, even while doing so for other workers.46  Such refusals play a 
significant part in the conflicts that track women into less desirable jobs or 
force them out of the workforce entirely, with lasting personal, health and 
financial consequences.47  Last year, the EEOC received over five thousand 
charges of pregnancy discrimination, making it one of the fastest-growing 
types of claims.48 
The work-pregnancy conflicts at stake in these cases overwhelmingly 
harm low-income workers and women in non-traditional, male-dominated 
jobs.49 First, these workers are most likely to experience lasting, 
devastating economic harm when these conflicts result in job loss.  Forty-
one percent of women are the primary breadwinners for their families, and 
their ability to work while pregnant is critical to their family’s economic 
survival.50  Moreover, the types of jobs that are especially likely to require 
accommodation for pregnancy are those that typically pay less, such as 
retail clerk and shelf stocker, or require physically rigorous tasks 
traditionally reserved for men, such as firefighter and police officer.51  
Representative examples include a pregnant food-server and restaurant 
line-worker who needed more bathroom breaks, a pregnant hotel cleaner 
with a twenty pound lifting restriction, and a pregnant security officer who 
needed a stool for sitting in a job that required long hours of standing.52  
When employers deny such simple accommodations, workers are 
terminated or forced to take unpaid leave, with devastating consequences.53 
 
 44 See id. 
 45 See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE BUSINESS CASE FOR ACCOMMODATING PREGNANT 
WORKERS (2012), available at 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnant_workers_business_case_12.04.12.pdf. 
 46 See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., IT SHOULDN’T BE A HEAVY LIFT: FAIR TREATMENT FOR 
PREGNANT WORKERS 5, 7 (2013), available at 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnant_workers.pdf. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See Claire Zillman, Yes, pregnancy discrimination at work is still a huge problem (July 15, 2014, 
5:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/07/15/pregnancy-discrimination/. 
 49 Id.; see also MAKING ROOM FOR PREGNANCY, supra note 41, at 5. 
 50 MAKING ROOM FOR PREGNANCY, supra note 41, at 3 (stating that forty-one percent of working 
mothers were their family’s primary breadwinner in 2010). 
 51 Id. at 5-7. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See A BETTER BALANCE: THE WORK & FAMILY LEGAL CENTER ET AL., THE REFUSAL TO 
ACCOMMODATE PREGNANT WORKERS: REAL ACCOUNTS OF THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES FOR 
WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES (2013), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/true_stories_about_why_pregnant_workers_need_workplace_accomm
odations.pdf. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 
72 WOMEN’S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 36 
Pregnant women who are not provided with needed accommodations have 
to struggle to support their families, often relying on governmental 
assistance to replace lost wages.54  They may also suffer from pregnancy-
related and health complications, particularly if, as many women do, they 
continue to work and refrain from asking about accommodations for fear of 
losing their jobs.55 
A loss in Young would give employers the green light to refuse even 
eminently reasonable accommodations for pregnant women.  In that event, 
PDA scholarship and advocacy should explore the need for alternative 
legislative solutions, such as the Pregnancy Workers Fairness Act. 
(PWFA)56 The PWFA is a proposed bill that was introduced to the House 
of Representatives on May 8th, 2012.57 The purpose of the bill is to 
eliminate discrimination and promote women’s health and economic 
security by ensuring reasonable workplace accommodations for workers 
whose ability to perform the functions of a job are limited by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or a related medical condition.58  Modeled after the ADA, the 
PWFA would require employers to make reasonable accommodations for 
pregnancy, child birth, and related conditions and bar employers from 
denying employment opportunities based on the need for accommodations.  
Under the bill, an employee could not be forced accept an accommodation 
if she preferred to continue in her existing job, nor could it force her to take 
a leave from work if a known reasonable alternative is available.59  The 
PWFA’s express goal is to raise the floor of treatment of pregnancy in the 
workplace so that “[n]o. . .woman [will] have to choose between her job 
and a healthy pregnancy.”60 
A loss in Young would leave pregnancy stuck in a growing gap between 
the PDA and the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), despite the 
compatible and mutually reinforcing purposes of the two Acts.61  Even 
though the American with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 
2008 broadened the universe of disabilities that require accommodations to 
include temporary impairments and less severe impairments, normal 
 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. at 3. 
 56 See Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 5647, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Senators Casey and Shaheen, Reps Nadler, Maloney, Speier, Davis and Fudge Introduce 
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act to Protect Pregnant Women from Workplace Discrimination, ROBERT 
P. CASEY, JR. (May 14, 2013), http://www.casey.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/senators-casey-and-
shaheen-reps-nadler-maloney-speier-davis-and-fudge-introduce-pregnant-workers-fairness-act-to-
protect-pregnant-women-from-workplace-discrimination (quoting Dina Bakst, President of A Better 
Balance). 
 61 See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT AND THE AMENDED 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: WORKING TOGETHER TO PROTECT WORKERS (2013), available at 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pda_adaaa_preg_workers_fact_sheet.pdf. 
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pregnancy is still not considered to be an impairment under the ADA.62  
And yet, since many of the temporary disabilities now protected under the 
ADAAA have similar work-related effects as pregnancy, they should raise 
bar for accommodating pregnant workers as well.63  Without a 
reinvigorated PDA through a victory for the petitioner in Young, the PWFA 
will be needed to close this gap. 
Against this backdrop of the current state of weak federal legal 
protections for pregnant workers, several states and cities have recently 
passed state and local laws to expand protections for pregnant workers.64 
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Texas, and West Virginia 
are among the states that have enacted laws specifically covering the work 
conflicts faced by pregnant workers.65 These state protections require 
employers to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnant workers.66 
For example, West Virginia recently passed its Pregnancy Workers 
Fairness Act, using the same title and substantive language as the proposed 
federal legislation.67  In addition to these states, several municipalities have 
enacted city ordinances to protect pregnant workers.68 The cities of New 
York, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Central Falls, Rhode Island; 
Providence, Rhode Island; and most recently Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania have 
all enacted city ordinances addressing work-pregnancy conflicts.69  Similar 
to state laws, these city ordinances require employers to reasonably 
accommodate conditions related to pregnancy.70 
While these state and local laws reflect a growing public commitment 
to ease the conflicts of work and pregnancy, they are not a substitute for 
federal-level protection.  For example, the city ordinances are limited in 
scope and application.71 For instance, the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
ordinance applies only to those businesses with city contracts worth 
$250,000 or more; contractors bidding on city jobs must certify that they 
 
 62 See id. at 1-2. 
 63 Id. at 2-3. 
 64 State and Local Laws Protecting Pregnant Workers, A BETTER BALANCE, 
http://www.abetterbalance.org/web/ourissues/fairness-for-pregnant-workers/310 (last visited Jan. 19, 
2015). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See W. VA. CODE R. §§ 5-11B-1-B-2 (2014). 
 68 State and Local Laws Protecting Pregnant Workers, supra note 64. 
 69 Id.; see also PITTSBURGH, PA., ORDINANCES ch. 161, art. VII, § 161.44 (2014), available at 
https://pittsburgh.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1911405&GUID=31C757AF-40A9-4C44-
8E7C-7EA971776160&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=pregnant. 
 70 Id.; State and Local Laws Protecting Pregnant Workers, supra note 64. 
 71 See Robert Zullo, Pittsburgh City Council advances panhandling restrictions, pregnancy 
protections (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/2014/10/02/Council-
advances-panhandling-restrictions-pregnancy-protections/stories/201410020233. 
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will comply with the ordinance and notify their employees.72 Although, the 
Pittsburgh city ordinance will still provide protection for approximately 
800 or more city employees and an undetermined number of contractors, it 
leaves many employees in the city without such protection.73  State laws 
and other city ordinances have similar gaps, and together create only a thin 
patchwork of remedies for pregnant workers. 
While it is commendable that states and municipalities have taken 
affirmative steps to address the current gap in federal law on a local level, 
such local laws fall far short of an adequate solution.  As the Young case 
illustrates, until this gap is closed at the federal level, pregnant workers will 































 72 See id; see also Pittsburgh Approves Workplace Protections for Pregnant City Employees, NAT’L 
P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES  (Oct. 17, 2014), 
http://go.nationalpartnership.org/site/News2?abbr=daily2_&page=NewsArticle&id=45843. 
 73 Pittsburgh Approves Workplace Protections for Pregnant City Employees, supra note 72. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 





                   In The Supreme Court of the United States 
————————————————————————————————— 
PEGGY YOUNG, Petitioner, 
v. 
 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Respondent. 
 
————————————————————————————————— 
On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of     
Appeals For The Fourth Circuit 
————————————————————————————————— 
BRIEF OF LAW PROFESSORS AND WOMEN’S AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
————————————————————————————————— 
JELENA KOLIC 
Staff Attorney LEGAL MOMENTUM 
5 Hanover Square 
Ste. 1502 
New York, NY 10004 (212) 413-7522 
     JOANNA L. GROSSMAN 
Counsel of Record 
Sidney & Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law 
HOFSTRA LAW SCHOOL 
121 Hofstra University 
Hempstead, NY 11549 
(516) 463-5241 
lawjlg@hofstra.edu 
DEBORAH L. BRAKE 
Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF LAW 
3900 Forbes Avenue 




COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964 
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 
76 WOMEN’S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 36 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………77 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ……………..81 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT……………………......81 
     ARGUMENTS 
I. The Decision Below Ignores the History of 
the PDA and Revives the Very Decisions 
Congress Sought To Supersede………….83 
II. The Decision Below Misconstrues and Mis- 
applies the Second Clause of the PDA …....86  
 A. The Second Clause of the PDA Creates 
and Defines a Right to Equal Treatment 
…………………………………………….86  
 B. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach Turns the 
Second Clause Into a Search for Animus and 
Misapprehends the Theory Behind  the  PDA 
…………………………………………..89 
III. The Expansion of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Will Further  Dismantle the 
PDA if the Court of Appeals’ Ruling Is 
Allowed to Stand…………………………97  
IV. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach Makes the 
PDA an Ineffective Remedy for Women in 














TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
   
CASES                                                                                  PAGE 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 
No. 1] Introduction Amici Curiae Brief in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 77 
 
Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 
265 (3d Cir. 2001) ………………………………………....88 
AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009) …….....85,106 
Cal.  Fed.  Sav.  &  Loan  Ass’n  v.  Guerra, 479 
U.S. 272 (1987)……………………………………..…84,97 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632 (1974)………………………………………………..…....…..85 
Coleman  v.  Ct.  of  Appeals,  132  S. Ct.  1327  
(2012) …………………………………………………………....…84,  93 
Cook County v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 
119 (2003) …………………………………………………............99 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) ……..96 
Dimino  v.  New York  City  Transit  Auth.,  64 
F. Supp. 2d 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ……………………..….103 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) ………….……passim 
     General Electric v.  Gilbert, 429  U.S. 125 (1976)……. passim  
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994)………………….99 
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 
499 U.S. 187 (1991) …………………………….………….…..….88 
 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) …………….96 
Lehmuller v.  Incorporated  Village of Sag Harbor,               
944 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)………………………103 
McDonnell  Douglas  Corp.  v.  Green,  411  U.S. 
792 (1973) ………………………………………………………94, 95 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) ……………...99 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983)………………………………84, 86, 89, 
95 
Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497 (1936) ……..100 
Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637 (7th 
Cir.2006)……………………………………..………..89,93, 
103 
Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 
540 (7th Cir. 2011) …………………………………………89 
Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380 (6th 
Cir. 2010) …………………………………………………..103 
Spivey v. Beverly Enters., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th 
Cir. 1999) …………………………………………………...93 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) ……….83 
Urbano v. Continental Airlines, 138 F.3d 204 
(5th Cir. 1998) ………………………………………....93 
Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 48020 (D. Kan. July 21, 2009) ………...…..104 
 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 
78 WOMEN’S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 36 
STATUTES 
 
42 U.S.C. §2000e (j) (2012) …………………………..89 
42 U.S.C. §12101(2)(A) (2012)…………………….99 
42 U.S.C. §12102 (2012) ……………………………..82 
Americans  with  Disabilities  Act,  42  U.S.C. 
 §12101 (2012)…………………………………………...passim 
Pregnancy  Discrimination  Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§2000e (k) (2012) ……………………………………………. passim 
  Title  VII  of  the  Civil  Rights Act  of  1964,   
42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (2012).……………………….84 
 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
 
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (2012) ………………………..99 
29 C.F.R. §1630.2(i) (2012) …………………………..98 
29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(ix) (2012) ………………………98 
 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
      
 Amending Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. 
Rep. No. 95-331 (1977)…………………………………86, 96 
     Katharine T. Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The 
Uniqueness Trap, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1532 (1974) ……….94     
     Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood 
Penalty, 59 Hastings L.J. 1359 (2008)…………………90  
     Stephanie Bornstein, Poor, Pregnant, and Fired: Caregiver   
Discrimination  Against  Low-Wage Workers,  University  of  
California,  Hastings College of the Law Center for Worklife 
Law (2011), available at http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/ 
PoorPregnantAndFired.pdf………………………………..104 
     Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: 
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35, 68 Duke J. Gender L. 
& Pol’y 67 (2013) ………………………………………………..90 
     Bureau of Labor  Statistics,  Employee  Benefits in the United 
States – March 2014 (July 25, 2014),  available  at  
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf …………….104 
Deborah Dinner,  Strange  Bedfellows  at  Work: 
Neomaternalism  in  the  Making  of  Sex  Dis- crimination  Law,  
91  Wash.  U.  L.  Rev.  453 (2014) …………………………..….84,  85,  90,  92 
Deborah  Dinner,  The  Costs  of  Reproduction: History  and  
the  Legal  Construction  of  Sex Equality,  46  Harv.  C.R.-C.L.  
L.  Rev.  415 (2011)  ……………………………………..……..85 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 
No. 1] Introduction Amici Curiae Brief in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 79 
Lucinda M. Finley,  Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out 
of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 
1118 (1986) ……………………………………………..…93 
Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex 
Discrimination, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1307 (2012)………........86, 91 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 Cinc. 
L. Rev. 1 (1975) .……………………………………………..….92 
Joanna  L.  Grossman, Pregnancy, Work,  and the Promise of 
Equal Citizenship, 98 Georgetown L.J. 567 (2010)……....85  
Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian Thomas, Making Pregnancy 
Work: Overcoming the  PDA’s Capacity-Based  Model,  21  Yale  J.L. 
& Feminism 15 (2009)……………………………………..95  
Jane A. Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in 
Performance Appraisals, 14 J. Org’l Behav. 649 (1993) ..102 
Michelle Hebl et al., Hostile and Benevolent Re- actions Toward 
Pregnant Women: Complementary Interpersonal Punishments and 
Rewards That Maintain Traditional  Roles,  92  J.  of Applied 
Psych. 1499 (2007). ……………………………………...…103 
Ariane Hegewisch & Heidi Hartmann, Occupational 
Segregation and the Gender Wage Gap: A Job Half Done, Institute 
For Women’s Policy Research (Jan. 2014) 
H.R. Rep. 95-948 (1978)……………………………….101  
Clair Infante-Rivard et al., Pregnancy Loss and Work 
Schedule During Pregnancy, 4 Epidemiology 73 (1993) ..102 
Karen J. Kruger, Pregnancy and Policing: Are They 
Compatible? Pushing the Legal Limits on Behalf of Equal 
Employment Opportunities, 22 Wisc. Women’s L.J. 61 
(2006) ……………………………………………………………….…….102, 103 
 Sylvia  A.  Law,  Rethinking  Sex  and  the  Constitution, 132 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 955 (1984) ……………………………………...84 
Melissa A. McDiarmid et al., Reproductive Hazards of Fire 
Fighting II: Chemical Hazards, 19 Am. J. of Industrial Medicine 
447 (1991) …………………………………………………...101 
Paula McDonald et al., Expecting the Worst: 
Circumstances Surrounding Pregnancy Dis- crimination at 
Work and Progress to Formal Redress, 39 Indus. Rel. J. 229 
(2008)……………………………………………………..104  
Oral Argument at 15:17, Geduldig v.  Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 
(1974) (No. 73-640), available at pedriani 
Nicholas Pedriana, Discrimination by Definition: The Historical 
and Legal Paths to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 
21 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1 (2009) ……………………………91 
Deborah L. Rhode, Speaking of Sex: The Denial of Gender 
Inequality (1997) …………………………………………...104 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 
80 WOMEN’S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 36 
Corina Schulze, Institutionalized  Masculinity in US Police 
Departments: How Maternity Leave Policies (or Lack Thereof) 
Affect Women in Policing, 23 Crim. J. Stud. 177 (2010) ……102 
Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s 
New Approach to Pregnancy Dis- crimination in Hibbs, 58 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1871  (2006) ………………………………………..92 
Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 
Mich. L. Rev. 69 (2011) ……………………………………….97 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from 
the Current Population Survey  (2014) ……………………..100 
U.S.  Census  Bureau,  American  Community  
Survey (2012)……………………………………………….101 
 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC 
Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy and  Related  Issues,  No.  
915.001,  July  14, 2014……………………………………...passim 
Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with 
Disabilities  Act,  46  U.C.  Davis  L.  Rev.  961 (2013) …. passim 
Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of 
Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional  Overrides,  84 
Notre  Dame L. Rev. 511 (2009) ………………………………85 
Joan C. Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy  
Accommodation  After  the  ADA Amendments Act, 32 Yale L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 97  (2013) ……………………………………………...…91,  92, 93 
Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the 
Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & 
Soc. Change 325 (1984-85)………………………………..91, 94 
Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on 
Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 175 
(1982) ………………………………………………………….94 
Women’s Bureau, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Nontraditional 
Occupations of Employed Women in 2010  (Aug. 2010),  











INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 
No. 1] Introduction Amici Curiae Brief in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 81 
Amici curiae are law professors, women’s rights 
organizations, and civil rights organizations that share 
expertise in pregnancy discrimination and a longstanding 
commitment to civil rights and equality in the workplace for all 
Americans. Their interest in this case is in ensuring that the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act is given its intended meaning. 
Statements of interest for the organizations and a list of 
individual signatories may be found in Appendix A. 
————————————————————————————————— 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case presents an issue of great significance for working 
women in the United States. The Fourth Circuit’s ruling 
interprets the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§2000e(k) (2012) (“PDA”), in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the statutory text, Congress’ intent, and this Court’s 
post-PDA precedents. The ruling reverts to a pre-PDA 
approach, placing pregnancy in a class by itself and excluding 
pregnant women from workplace benefits and accommodations  
available  to  others  who  are  similar in their ability or inability 
to work. The ruling undermines the very purpose of the PDA, 
which was to help pregnant women maintain labor-force 
attachments and have greater economic stability. 
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling reinvigorates the reasoning in 
General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which the PDA 
was specifically passed to supersede. It marks a return to the 
philosophy that employers can provide less support for 
pregnancy than they do for other health conditions that affect 
work, so long as their decision to deny coverage is not motivated 
by animus. But the PDA repudiates this approach. In its 
Second Clause, the Act defines what equal treatment means: 
employers must treat pregnant workers “the same .  .  .  as 
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). In other words, the 
PDA creates a comparative right of accommodation with a  
 
____________________________________________________ 
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amici states that no counsel for a party 
authored this brief in whole or in part, and that no person other than amici, their 
members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or 
submission of this brief. Counsel for petitioner and respondent have consented to its 
filing in letters on file with the Court. 
 
 
baseline that turns on the work effects of an employee’s 
incapacity, rather than its source. This mandate solves the 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 
82 WOMEN’S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 36 
analogy problem that plagued pre-PDA courts and led 
employers to simply exempt pregnancy, a health condition that 
affects only women, from otherwise available benefits. This 
Court has consistently instructed that the Second Clause means 
what it says – that pregnant workers cannot be treated worse 
than workers with similar limitations. 
By refusing to allow Peggy Young to compare herself to 
workers injured on the job, workers whose accommodations 
were required by a collective bargaining agreement, or workers 
entitled to accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 (“ADA”), the Fourth Circuit has stripped 
pregnant women of most potential comparators. This renders 
the comparative right of accommodation around which the 
PDA is built essentially meaning- less. This problem will only 
escalate with the recent amendments to the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 
§12102, which expand the pool of employees entitled to 
reasonable accommodation to include those with temporary 
conditions analogous to pregnancy. Under this reading, 
Congress’ expansion of protections for employees with other 
disabilities would have the perverse effect of decreasing the 
level of support for pregnancy. The Fourth Circuit’s approach, 
if left standing, will exponentially widen the gulf in employment 
opportunities between pregnant women and others “similar in 
their ability or inability to work.” See 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). 
Nothing in the text of the ADA or its amendments supports 
this reading, nor is there any precedent for allowing one 
statute to nullify another without ex- press Congressional 
direction to do so. 
The Fourth Circuit’s central mistake is to collapse the PDA’s 
first and second clauses into a singular search for animus. 
Instead of simply asking whether Peggy Young was treated 
worse than other employees similar in their ability or inability to 
work, as clearly mandated by the statutory text, the Fourth Circuit 
mistakenly applied the pretext model of proof in a search for 
an invidious motive. But a formal policy that ignores the 
PDA’s directive to treat two groups the same is unlawful 
disparate treatment, regardless of the motive underlying the 
policy. This approach ignores the PDA’s clear command to 
focus on the effects of pregnancy rather than its unique nature 
in order to ensure equal opportunity for women and mothers. 
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling exacerbates harmful stereotypes 
about  pregnant  workers,  one of the primary problems the 
PDA was intended to counteract. The lower court’s reasoning 
and approach traffic in the notion that pregnancy is a unique 
liability undeserving of accommodation and reinforce a gender 
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ideology that is incompatible with women’s full participation 
in the labor force. 
Moreover, the women most in need of the PDA’s protection 
are most harmed by the ruling below. The persistence of 
pregnancy discrimination in the work- place is well documented, 
but it is women in low-wage jobs or traditionally male-dominated 
occupations who are most likely to experience temporary 
conflicts between the physical effects of pregnancy and job 
requirements. Studies and caselaw reveal a reluctance by some 
employers to provide even minor and costless accommodations, 
reflecting hostility to pregnant women in the workplace. 
Pregnancy discrimination excludes women from traditionally 
‘male’ jobs and renders low-wage, sex-segregated jobs less secure. 
The Fourth Circuit’s misunderstanding of the PDA’s Second 
Clause will create profound economic instability for such women 
and their families, leading to well- known obstacles to re-entry if 
they lose their jobs. 
In sum, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling adopts a view of 
pregnancy discrimination that belies both the text and intent of 
the PDA, reinforces stereotypes about the incompatibility of 
pregnancy with paid employment, and undermines this Court’s 
longstanding commitment to the “equal opportunity to aspire, 
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on .  .  .  
individual talents and capacities.” United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515, 532 (1996). 
For these reasons, we urge the Court to reverse the Fourth 





I. THE DECISION BELOW IGNORES THE HISTORY 
OF THE PDA AND REVIVES THE VERY DECISIONS 
CONGRESS SOUGHT TO SUPERSEDE 
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling belies the history that led to the 
PDA’s enactment. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 
(1974), this Court refused to recognize that the exclusion of 
pregnancy, a condition only affecting women, from an 
otherwise near- comprehensive disability plan discriminates on 
the basis of sex. Although criticism of Geduldig would soon 
become a “cottage industry,” Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and 
the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 983 (1984), and the 
opinion would later become one with a “widely criticized 
conclusion” that members of this Court are “perhaps 
embarrassed” to cite, Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 
84 WOMEN’S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 36 
1347 n.6  (2012)  (Ginsburg,  J.,  dissenting),  its  circle  of 
damage was nonetheless expanded two years later. In General 
Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 128 (1976), this Court applied 
the same formalistic reasoning to hold that pregnancy 
discrimination was not a form of sex discrimination under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et 
seq. (2012). The Court thus upheld a private employer’s 
policy that denied disability benefits during pregnancy leave 
while granting them for other types of temporary leave. Briefs 
in Geduldig had urged this Court to consider the potential 
impact on Title VII, see Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at 
Work: Neomaternalism in the Making of Sex Discrimination 
Law, 91 Wash. U.L. Rev. 453, 485, 491-92 (2014), for fear of this 
exact result. 
Congress enacted the PDA for the express purpose of 
repudiating this Court’s holding in Gilbert and the Geduldig 
reasoning that drove it. Congress did not hide its disdain for 
Gilbert and its intent to over- ride it. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 277 (1987) (observing that the 
PDA unambiguously rejected Gilbert); Newport News Shipbuild- 
ing & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983) (same). 
The PDA contains two distinct clauses. The First Clause rejects 
Gilbert by adding a new provision to the definitions section of 
Title VII, pro- viding that the “terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the 
basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the 
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 
U.S.C. §2000e(k). Notably, the two quoted phrases  in  the  statute  
appear,  in  this  precise form, nowhere else in the statute. They 
do appear, however, in the Gilbert decision. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 
135, 145 (holding that the exclusion of  pregnancy does not 
discriminate “on the basis of sex” and is compatible with 
Congress’ command to prohibit discrimination “ ‘because of . . . 
sex’ “). This particular drafting of the statute makes sense only 
as a direct response to Gilbert. The Second Clause directs how 
employers must treat pregnant workers: “the same .  .  .  as 
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). 
In enacting the PDA, Congress recognized that employer 
responses to pregnancy have played a central role in workplace 
discrimination against women. As Justice Ginsburg has 
observed, “[c]ertain attitudes about pregnancy and childbirth, 
throughout human history, have sustained pervasive, often law- 
sanctioned, restrictions on a woman’s place among paid 
workers and active citizens.” AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 
701, 724 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Cleveland Bd. 
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of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634-35 (1974) (striking 
down school board rule forcing pregnant teachers to take 
unpaid leave after the fourth month of pregnancy); Joanna L. 
Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal 
Citizenship, 98 Georgetown L.J. 567, 595-600 (2010) 
(discussing exclusionary policies and practices). Congress 
responded to this history with specific directives to eliminate a 
wide-range of employment policies  that  openly  discriminated  
against  pregnant workers or  based employment  decisions  on 
stereo- typed assumptions about their capacity to work. The 
PDA was designed to make the workplace as amenable to 
pregnancy as it was to other conditions affecting work – 
something employers had been reluctant to do on their own, 
even when unions pushed for such treatment in the collective 
bargaining process. See Dinner, Strange Bedfellows, supra, at 472-
74. 
The PDA was a swift rejection of the Court’s earlier 
philosophy on pregnancy: that ignoring the status of pregnancy 
fully met an employer’s obligation to pregnant workers. 
Instead, the Act was de- signed to “enable women to maintain 
labor-force attachments throughout pregnancy and childbirth.” 
Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the 
Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 
415, 484 (2011). Thus, the decision below, which equates 
pregnancy-blindness with PDA compliance ignores – even 
defies  –  that  history. See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow 
Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory 
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 511, 551-56 (2009). By characterizing UPS’s light-duty 
policy as “pregnancy-blind,” the Fourth Circuit is engaging in 
the same kind of formalistic reasoning as the Court did in 
Geduldig and Gilbert. See Cary Franklin, Inventing the 
“Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 
1307, 1358-59 (2012) (noting that “Gilbert relied on the same 
nar- row, anticlassificationist reasoning . . . [seeing dis- 
crimination as applicable] .  .  .  only to practices that sort men 
and women into two groups perfectly differentiated on the basis 
of biological sex.”). The policies in Gilbert and Geduldig could 
easily have been deemed “pregnancy blind” under the Fourth 
Circuit’s standard if reworded only slightly to specify a near-
exhaustive list of covered conditions while omitting pregnancy. 
Allowing this ruling to stand would breathe life into precedent 
specifically overridden by Congress. 
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II. THE DECISION BELOW MISCONSTRUES AND 
MISAPPLIES THE SECOND CLAUSE OF THE PDA 
 
A. The Second Clause of the PDA Creates and Defines a 
Right to Equal Treatment. 
 
The decision below fails to give any effect to the Second 
Clause of the PDA, which provides that “women affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be 
treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as 
other  persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). To remedy a long- 
standing problem of employer policies that treated pregnancy as 
sui generis and denied pregnant women otherwise generally 
available benefits, Congress created a comparison group for 
pregnant women – employees “similar in their ability or 
inability to work” – and directed that the two groups be treated 
“the same for all employment-related purposes.” Id.; see also 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 
669, 678 n.14 (1983) (“The meaning of the first clause is not 
limited by the specific language  in  the  second  clause,  which  
explains  the application of the general principle to women 
employees.”). 
The Second Clause, by design, solves the analogy problem – 
the idea that pregnancy could be treated worse simply because 
it was not identical to any other work-limiting condition – that 
lay behind Geduldig and Gilbert. It establishes a baseline – a 
“floor . . . not a ceiling,” Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285 – that 
entitles pregnant workers to identify instances of unequal 
treatment and demand parity. Moreover, as this Court made clear 
in Guerra, under the PDA, a comparator may be selected only 
on the basis of ability or inability to work: the employer’s 
motivation for accommodating the needs of the comparator is 
irrelevant. This remains true when the employer is compelled to 
treat a comparator in a certain manner in order to comply with 
some other law. See Section III infra. As the House Report 
on the PDA explains, the Second Clause provides the only 
appropriate point of comparison for  pregnant workers  with 
comparable  limitations: “their actual ability to perform work.”  
H.R. Rep. 95-948, at 5 (1978); see also Amending Title VII, Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, S. Rep. No. 95-331, at 4 (1977) (“Under 
this bill, the treatment of pregnant women in covered  
employment  must  focus  not  on their condition alone but on the 
actual effects of that condition on h a their ability to work. 
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Pregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to 
work on the same conditions as other employees.”). 
This interpretation does not convert the comparative right of 
accommodation into an absolute one, requiring “special 
treatment” for pregnant workers who require accommodation. 
Quite the contrary. Accommodating workers with comparable 
limitations but not pregnant workers disadvantages pregnant 
women. As the new guidance issued by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) makes clear, 
employers can limit the number or duration of light-duty 
assignments, or even refuse to offer them altogether, as long as 
limits or restrictions apply to pregnant and non-pregnant workers 
with similar levels of incapacity alike. See U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Enforcement 
Guidance on Pregnancy and Related Issues, No. 915.001, July 
14, 2014, at 11 (hereinafter “EEOC Guidance”). But what they 
cannot do is offer benefits to some similarly restricted workers 
while withholding them from pregnant workers. 
Peggy Young’s complaint simply asks that the Second Clause 
of the PDA be given the effect its text mandates. The Second 
Clause denotes an additional and distinctive obligation with 
independent meaning. The statute’s structure makes this 
apparent. The Second Clause is set off by a semi-colon  and  the 
word “and,” and it includes a verb – “shall” – that clearly 
imposes a discrete obligation on employers: employers “shall” 
treat pregnant workers the “same” as  other  workers  with  
similar  work  limitations.2 
Moreover, the Second Clause does not invite employers to 
treat pregnancy only as well as other least favored workers. 
Even the policies at issue in Geduldig and Gilbert, which 
Congress clearly rejected under Title VII, excluded some other 
conditions – dispsomania and sexual psychopathy, for example 
– along with pregnancy. 
 
__________________________________________________ 
2 That the PDA appears in the definitional section of Title VII is of no matter. 
The mandate for religious accommodations appears there as well, but has been given full 
substantive effect. 
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The PDA directive is simple. If an employer provides 
support for other health conditions that interfere with work, it 
must provide the same level of support for pregnancy. Indeed, 
the Fourth Circuit conceded that “[s]tanding alone, the second 
clause’s plain language is unambiguous.” The lower court 
nevertheless declined to apply its clear import by alleging that its 
juxtaposition with the first clause creates “confusion” and 
“potential incongruence.” Pet App. 20a-21a. It then resolved its 
straw-man conflict by taking the draconian step of rendering the 
Second Clause meaningless, in direct contravention of this 
Court’s warning not to “read the second clause out of the Act,” 
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 
205 (1991). The ruling below asserts  that  the  Second  Clause  
“does  not  create  a distinct and independent cause of action,” 
not because the text does not support that reading,  but  because 
such a reading would create “anomalous consequences” such as 
treating pregnancy “more favorably than any other basis” under 
Title VII. Pet. App. 20a-21a. But this is clearly incorrect. 
Providing an accommodation to a pregnant employee when an 
employer has made the same accommodation available  to  employ- 
ees with other health conditions is not “more favorable” 
treatment – it is simply equal treatment, as mandated by the 
PDA. As this Court explained in Johnson Controls, 499  U.S. at  
204, “The  PDA’s amendment to Title VII contains a BFOQ 
standard of its own: Unless  pregnant  employees  differ  from 
others ‘in their ability or inability to work,’ they must be ‘treated 
the same’ as other employees ‘for all employment-related  
purposes.’ “  (quoting  42  U.S.C. §2000e(k)). Eschewing this 
Court’s holding that “the PDA means what it says,” id. at 211, 
the court below departed from the text and its intended 
meaning to circumscribe protection for pregnant workers. 
 
____________________________________________________ 
See 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j) (2012); Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 281 
& n.12 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, the text of the Second Clause cannot be “ ‘substituted’ in 
for sex” in the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII without resulting in 
“grammatically incoherent directives.” Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 
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B. The Fourth  Circuit’s Approach  Turns the Second Clause 
Into a Search for Animus and Misapprehends the Theory 
Behind the PDA. 
 
The court below neglected the teachings of this Court’s 
PDA decisions and misunderstood both the theory behind 
PDA and the approach to pregnancy discrimination it 
embraces. This Court has long been clear that treating 
pregnancy differently than other conditions with a similar 
effect on work violates the statute regardless of the employer’s 
motivation. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199 (“Whether 
an employment practice involves disparate treatment through 
explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the 
employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the 
discrimination.”); Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 (“The 1978 
Act makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-
related conditions less favorably than other medical 
conditions.”). In- stead of simply applying the Second Clause, 
the court below embarked on an unnecessary and ill-conceived 
search for anti-pregnancy animus. Pet. App. 17a-18a (faulting 
plaintiff ‘s lack of “evidence of UPS’s discriminatory animus 
toward pregnant workers”); Pet. App. 28a (stating that the 
“facts fail to demonstrate the specific animus Young ascribes 
to them”); Pet. App. 17a-19a (rejecting plaintiff ‘s evidence for 
failing to show “general corporate animus against pregnant 
employees”). Finding none, the court pronounced the UPS 
policy “pregnancy-blind.” Pet. App. 18a. The Fourth Circuit is 
not alone on this misguided path. See Serednyj v. Beverly 
Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2011); Reeves 
v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2006). This 
Court must remind lower courts that no additional proof of 
intent is required if a plaintiff proves that her employer 
treated pregnancy worse than other conditions with a similar 
effect on work. 
The Fourth Circuit’s insistence on proof of an anti-
pregnancy bias behind the UPS policy parallels the reasoning 
of the short-lived Gilbert decision. Like the court below, the 
Gilbert Court faulted the plaintiff for failing to prove that the 
employer’s policy of omitting coverage for pregnancy was a 
pretext for intentional discrimination. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. 
at 135-36. Instead of finding “invidious” discrimination, the 
Court found the employer’s temporary disability policy was 
predicated upon a neutral, cost-driven calculus. Id. at 130-32, 
136; see also Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494 (explaining the state’s 
different treatment of pregnancy as “a policy determination” 
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reflecting cost-based judgments rather than “invidious discrim- 
ination”). 
Taking the same wrong turn, the court below assumed that a 
neutrally-framed explanation for treating pregnancy worse than 
other conditions renders it non-discriminatory. But purportedly 
neutral explanations, such as cost, have always been available 
to explain the sui generis treatment of pregnancy, even as they 
masked implicit assumptions about women’s worth as 
employees and the effect of pregnancy on worker productivity. 
See Dinner, Strange Bedfellows, supra, at 476-79 (explaining 
that cost estimates contained biases about the expected return 
on employer investments in workers and assumptions about 
conflicts between work and pregnancy); id. at 475-76 (tracking 
the substitution of cost-based rationales for overt gender 
stereotyping, once the latter became politically unpalatable). 
The PDA responded to that history by ensuring that any cost-
benefit analysis would be conducted “without the overlay of still 
prevalent stereotypes and bias about the capacity of pregnant 
employees or the likelihood that pregnant employees return to 
work after childbirth.” Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The 
Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the 
Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
961, 1028 (2013). Yet light-duty exclusions also implicitly rely 
on stereotype-driven assessments of cost to justify including 
the favored conditions while omit- ting pregnancy. Id. at 1032. 
As Congress well understood in enacting the PDA, 
stereotypes about pregnancy have long shaped employer 
responses to pregnant workers and work- place policies 
governing pregnancy, and they continue to do so today. Social 
science research documents the persistence of gender stereotypes 
triggered by an employee’s pregnancy. See Deborah L. Brake & 
Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Dis- 
crimination Act at 35, 68 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 67, 103-
107 (2013) (discussing social science research on pregnancy and 
maternity bias in the workplace). Some of these stereotypes are 
descriptive, ascribing to pregnant workers a lower level of 
competence and a reduced commitment to the workplace. See 
Grossman, supra, at 577 (collecting and describing studies); 
Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Mother- hood 
Penalty, 59 Hastings L.J. 1359, 1369-72 (2008) (same). Others 
are prescriptive, prioritizing women’s maternal functions and  
devaluing  women’s  roles as workers. See  Joan C. Williams et 
al., A Sip  of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the 
ADA Amendments Act, 32 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 97, 103-104 
(2013) (citing studies). The PDA responds to both sets of 
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stereotypes by ensuring that pregnant women have the same 
rights to work, and under the same conditions, as other 
employees with conditions similarly affecting work capacity. 
In failing to grasp  the  discriminatory  treatment in UPS’s 
policy, the court below misunderstood the theory at the heart of 
the PDA. Both proponents and opponents of the Act understood 
that contested assumptions about  pregnant  workers  were  at  the  
heart of the fight over the baseline by which to set the 
nondiscriminatory treatment of pregnancy. The Act’s detractors 
grounded their arguments in  traditional views about women, 
especially mothers, as “ ‘margin- al participants in labor markets.’ 
“ Franklin, supra, at 1321; see also id. at 1336 n.140 (citing 
arguments employers made to the EEOC in 1965, urging a nar- 
row definition of sex discrimination because women leave the 
workforce when they marry and employer investments in worker 
training are lost). PDA proponents made their case for the 
legislation by high- lighting the significance of gender stereotypes 
about pregnancy to women’s equal rights at work. See Nicholas 
Pedriana, Discrimination by Definition: The Historical and Legal 
Paths to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 21 Yale J.L. 
& Feminism 1, 12 (2009) (citing testimony and views of PDA 
proponents). As Wendy Williams, a key proponent of the PDA, 
explained the backdrop to the legislation: 
 
Pervasively, pregnancy was treated less favorably 
than other  physical  conditions  that affected 
workplace performance. The pattern of rules 
telegraphed the underlying assumption: a 
woman’s pregnancy signaled her dis- engagement 
from the workplace. Implicit was not only a factual 
but a normative judgment: when wage-earning 
women became pregnant they did, and should, go 
home. 
 
Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the  Equal  
Treatment/Special  Treatment  Debate,  13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 325, 335 (1984-85). 
Employers’ differential treatment of pregnancy was a key 
part of the systemic stereotyping to which the PDA responded: 
the refusal to treat pregnant women as “real” workers. See 
Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water, supra, at 103 (“women who 
seek accommodations for a condition arising out of pregnancy 
frequently meet with hostility fueled by gender stereotyping”). 
The Second Clause is a corrective to a particular form of 
pregnancy discrimination that took shape historically – and, as  
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this case makes clear, persists. As employers developed more 
generous benefit plans in order to attract skilled labor in 
response to a tightening labor market, they exempted pregnant 
workers from these benefits, seeing them as poor investments, 
more likely to leave the workplace and be supported by a male 
breadwinner. See Dinner, Strange Bedfellows, supra, at 496-97 
& n.188 (citing PDA opponents’ arguments that pregnant 
women leave the workplace); id. at 498 (noting opponent’s 
argument that disability benefits should be reserved for family 
providers and “women are not breadwinners”). This same 
gender ideology underlay the state’s argument in Geduldig, 
defending its omission of pregnancy on the ground that women 
return to work after pregnancy at lower levels than workers 
recovering from other conditions. See Oral Argument at 15:17, 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-640), available 
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_73_640 (“ . . . 
there is a major difference in the return to work rate following 
disability from pregnancy”); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Gender and the Constitution, 44 Cinc. L. Rev. 1, 42 (1975) 
(articulating the Court’s implicit rationale in Geduldig that 
“pregnancy- related disability has no place in a worker’s 
benefit program” because “childbirth  marks  a  new  period in 
the woman’s life cycle” in which “she should be supported by 
the family’s man, not the state or an employer she is destined 
to leave”). 
The same set of gender stereotypes that forced pregnant 
women out of some jobs altogether (as in the school teacher 
cases) also prompted employers to adopt workplace policies that  
treated  pregnancy worse than other conditions affecting work 
capacity. See Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: 
Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in 
Hibbs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1871, 1894 (2006) (“Failure to treat 
pregnant employees ‘the same as other persons not so affected 
but similar in their ability or inability to work’ reflects the 
unconstitutional sex-role stereotype that, as Hibbs put it, ‘wom- 
en’s family duties trump those of the workplace.’ “). These 
distinct forms of pregnancy discrimination are interrelated and 
reinforcing. The unfavorable treatment of pregnancy in 
workplace policies on benefits and accommodations is an 
effective way to push pregnant women out of their jobs. See 
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of 
the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 
1118, 1123-24 (1986). Both types of discrimination – the 
outright termination of pregnant employees and workplace 
policies disfavoring pregnancy from other conditions – are 
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predicated on the same stereo- typical view of women as 
mothers first, workers second. See Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals, 
132 S. Ct. 1327, 1343 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 
witness in PDA hearings articulating the gender ideology behind 
pregnancy discrimination, that “women are mothers first, and 
workers second”); id. at 1345 (dis- cussing the gender 
stereotypes about women’s commitment to the workforce that 
underlie pregnancy discrimination). 
These stereotypes continue to have traction through the 
policies of employers, like UPS, that re- fuse light-duty 
accommodations for pregnancy, de- spite granting them to 
workers with other conditions similarly affecting work. Cf. 
Finley, supra, at 1136 (discussing the stereotypes underlying 
employer refusals to fold pregnancy into workplace policies on 
the same terms as other conditions, including: that pregnancy is 
a voluntary, natural choice for women; that employers should 
not have to bear the costs of covering it; and that doing so 
would be unfair to the “real” workers deserving of such benefits). 
 Despite these core lessons of the PDA, the court below 
stubbornly and repeatedly referred to the PDA’s directive in 
the Second Clause as requiring “preferential” treatment for 
pregnancy or, even more derisively, “most favored nation” 
status. Pet. App. 19a-23a; see also Reeves, 446 F.3d at 642 
(rejecting plaintiff ‘s challenge to discriminatory light-duty policy 
as asking for “preferential treatment”); Urbano v. Continental 
Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Spivey v. 
Beverly Enters., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (same). This 
disparaging terminology itself bespeaks a grave 
misunderstanding of the PDA and reinstates the very stereotypes 
about work and pregnancy that the Act was designed to 
eradicate. See Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water, supra, at 
103-104 (tracing courts’ “intuition that pregnant women are 
asking for ‘special treatment’ “ to gender-stereotyped views 
linking the costs of accommodating male workers to the 
“ordinary costs of doing business,” but costs associated with 
pregnancy as “something extra that employers should not have 
to shoulder”). Indeed, the Gilbert Court used this exact same 
baseline, classifying the excision of pregnancy from the 
employer’s benefit plan as neutral – and by extension, rendering 
any inclusion of pregnancy alongside the favored conditions 
to be special treatment. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-35. 
Congress rebuked this very reasoning when it enacted the 
PDA. The Act responded to the flawed view that pregnancy is 
“unique” by isolating the effects of pregnancy on one’s capacity 
to work as the proper point for comparison. Cf. Katharine T. 
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Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 
62 Cal. L. Rev. 1532, 1536 (1974) (“ .  .  .  pregnancy’s unique 
identifiability facilitates drafting laws and regulations based on 
exactly those generalizations, stereotypes, and assumptions that 
constitutional doctrine in the area of sex discrimination was 
intended to curb.”). By honing in on the work effects of 
pregnancy, the PDA drives home the key lesson that, in its 
effects on work, pregnancy is not unique after all, but one part 
of a broad complex of human conditions that affect work 
capacity. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some 
Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 Women’s 
Rts. L. Rep. 175, 193 (1982). The Second Clause instructs 
that treating pregnancy as well as other conditions with a 
similar effect on work is not special treatment, but rather the 
very definition of what it means not to discriminate on the basis 
of pregnancy. 
The decision below and others like it veer so far off course 
in part because they insist on shoehorning all PDA claims into 
the McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 
pretext proof framework, which was designed  to  smoke  out  
discriminatory intent from circumstantial evidence. Pet. App. 25a- 
29a; see also Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra, at 1018-26 (discussing 
and critiquing lower courts’ use of this framework in rejecting 
PDA challenges to discriminatory accommodation policies). 
While the  pretext model is applicable to pregnancy discrimination 
cases if  the  contested  issue  is  whether  the  plaintiff ‘s pregnancy 
was the reason for the adverse action taken against her, it is 
not necessary in cases like this one, where the employer 
admits to treating pregnancy worse than other conditions with a 
similar effect on work. See Williams, Equality’s Riddle, supra, at 
349 (“With Newport News, Gilbert’s  conceptual framework is 
definitively interred. Pregnancy-based rules prima facie violate 
Title VII. . . . The more complicated inquiries [of pretext] .  .  .  
are now irrelevant.”); cf. id. at 349 n.101 (noting the 
continuing viability of the pretext model where the adverse 
action is not taken pursuant to an employer policy, but 
allegedly based on a covert intent to discriminate because of 
pregnancy); Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian Thomas, Making 
Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the PDA’s Capacity-Based 
Model, 21 Yale J.L. & Feminism 15, 36 (2009) (arguing that 
exclusionary light- duty policies constitute per se disparate 
treatment). In the case below, there was no need to “smoke out” 
the employer’s intent behind its differential treatment of 
pregnancy. Proof that the employer grants light-duty work for 
other conditions with a similar effect on work, but not for 
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pregnancy, establishes the violation. See EEOC Guidance, supra, 
at 12 (“A plaintiff need not resort to the burden shifting analy- 
sis set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green in order to 
establish a violation of the PDA where there is .  .  .  evidence 
that a pregnant employee was denied a light-duty position 
provided to other employees who are similar to the pregnant 
employee in their ability to work.”). 
Even though the McDonnell-Douglas  model  and its prima 
facie case might be sufficiently modified to fit the fact patterns 
in the refusal-to-accommodate cases, there is no reason to do 
so. Filtering the evidence through the prima facie case, 
followed by the employer’s proffer of a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the differential treatment  of  pregnancy, 
and culminating in an inquiry into whether the proffered reason 
is a pretext for discrimination, is unnecessarily formalistic and 
encourages courts to focus on the wrong issue: the employer’s 
subjective mindset in treating pregnancy differently.3  
The text of the Second Clause leaves no room for a 
distinction based on the source of the condition to masquerade 
as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason. See Amending Title 
VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. Rep. No. 95-331, at 4 (1977) (“the 
treatment of pregnant women in covered employment must focus 
not on their condition alone but on the actual effects of that 
condition on their ability to work”); EEOC Guidance, supra, at 
7 (“An employer  may  not  refuse  to  treat  a  pregnant  worker the 
same as other employees who are similar in their ability or 
inability to work by relying on a policy that makes distinctions 
based on the source of an employee’s limitations (e.g., a 
policy of providing light duty only to workers injured on the 
job).”); id. at 12 (stating that a rule differentiating pregnancy 
from other conditions based on place of injury (on-the-job or 
not) is not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason). 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3 The pretext model continues to be useful, however, in cases where the employer 
purports to follow a non-discriminatory policy treating pregnancy the same as other 
conditions similarly affecting work, but plaintiff proves that the asserted pregnancy- 
neutral reason is actually a pretext for discrimination. See EEOC Guidance, supra, at 
12 (giving example where employer explains denial of light-duty to pregnant worker 
“based on something other than the source of an employee’s limitation,” such as a 
cap on the number of light-duty assignments avail- able, but the plaintiff proves that 
the employer has waived that cap for non-pregnant workers). 
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Accepting a rule about the source of an employee’s condition 
as a legitimate reason for the differential treatment of 
pregnancy would be to accept “the very stereotype the law 
condemns.” J.E.B.  v.  Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994) 
(quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1990)). Nor is it any 
less of a violation of statutory text if the employer, when it 
adopted a policy that accommodated other conditions with a 
similar effect on work, did so out of neglect as op- posed to a 
deliberate, conscious intent to disfavor pregnancy. Unless 
justified as a BFOQ, it is an un- lawful employment practice 
to treat pregnancy less well than comparable disability, 
regardless of the employer’s motive for doing so. See Johnson 
Controls, 499 U.S. at 199 (“[T]he absence of a malevolent 
motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a 
neutral policy with a discriminatory effect”).  
 Courts instead should permit plaintiffs to prove pregnancy 
discrimination directly by establishing the employer’s 
differential treatment of pregnancy compared to other conditions 
with a similar effect on work. While the court below opened the 
door to proving discrimination directly  as an alternative to 
the pretext model, it wrongly grafted onto this meth- od a 
requirement that the plaintiff provide “direct evidence” of 
“animus” against pregnancy. Pet. App. 17a-18a, 24a-25a. This 
compounds the error dis- cussed above, turning a determination 
of differential treatment into a search for subjective animus. See 
EEOC Guidance, supra, at 11 (stating that even without proof 
of employer statements evidencing anti-pregnancy animus, “a 
pregnant worker may still establish a violation of the PDA by 
showing that she was denied light duty or other 
accommodations that were granted to other employees who are 
similar in the their ability or inability to work.”). Neither the 
employer’s reason for treating pregnancy differently nor the 
nature of the evidence offered are material. Cf. Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003) (rejecting a “direct 
evidence” requirement in mixed motive cases because the 
statute makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct 
evidence); see also EEOC Guidance, supra, at 7 (“Pregnant 
employees seeking to establish that they have not been treated 
the same as other employees similar in their ability or 
inability to work can establish unequal treatment through 
various forms of evidence.”). 
To the law’s detriment, some lower courts, including the 
court below, have allowed the proof frameworks to become the 
tail that wags the dog. Cf. Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking 
Discrimination Law, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 69 (2011) (criticizing 
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lower courts’ reflexive use of judicially devised proof frameworks 
in lieu of more straightforward applications of statutory text). In 
doing so, they have transformed the Second Clause of the PDA 
from a clear directive to treat pregnancy at least as well as other 
conditions similarly affecting one’s ability to work and into a 
search for pregnancy-based animus. 
 
III. THE EXPANSION OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT WILL FURTHER DISMANTLE THE 
PDA IF THE COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING IS 
ALLOWED TO STAND 
 
The rights guaranteed by the PDA are comparative. The 
PDA does not create any absolute entitlement, but makes the 
level of treatment due pregnant workers contingent on how the 
employer treats non- pregnant workers with conditions similarly 
affecting work. As this Court has explained, “Congress intended 
the PDA to be a floor beneath which pregnancy disability 
benefits may not drop. . . .” Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987). Disregarding this directive, 
the ruling below incorrectly – and inexplicably – placed ADA-
accommodated individuals outside the realm of comparison for 
pregnant workers under the PDA. Pet. App. 18a-19a, 27a. The 
court was egregiously wrong in doing so. 
Under the PDA, the employer’s reason for re- fusing to 
accommodate pregnant workers despite accommodating non-
pregnant workers is not material. That some non-pregnant 
workers may be accommodated pursuant to another legal 
mandate does not remove their treatment as a baseline for 
pregnant workers. As this Court made clear in the alternative 
holding in Guerra, if the PDA had required identical treatment 
of pregnant  and  non-pregnant  workers in that case, employers 
could have complied  with both the PDA and the California law 
mandating maternity leave by extending comparable leaves to 
non-pregnant, similarly affected workers. Guerra, 479 
U.S. at 290-91. The same reasoning applies to employees 
entitled to accommodation under the ADA. See EEOC 
Guidance, supra, at 7 (a PDA violation may be established by 
“evidence that reasonable accommodations .  .  .  are provided 
under the ADA to individuals with disabilities who are similar 
to a pregnant worker in terms of their ability or inability to 
work.”); id. at 11 (Example 10). 
Indeed, it would be nothing less than bizarre for the PDA’s 
baseline to depend on whether the employ- er voluntarily 
accommodated other conditions or did so solely by force of law. 
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In such a universe, voluntary accommodation of disability would 
create the obligation to accommodate pregnancy, but the passage 
of a disability law would eliminate it. The Second Clause 
permits no such shenanigans and simply makes the minimum 
level of treatment for pregnant workers depend on the 
accommodations available to non- pregnant but similarly 
capable workers. Such an approach would also flatly 
contradict the PDA’s history, including early applications of the 
Act forcing employers to extend to pregnancy those  benefits 
that they were already required by law to provide to other 
conditions similarly affecting work. See Widiss, Gilbert Redux, 
supra, at 967-68 (discussing the PDA’s interaction with other 
statutory mandates and explaining that the PDA required 
“leveling up” for pregnancy, “even if an employer’s exclusion of 
pregnancy from disability, health insurance, sick day, or other 
policies was due to pregnancy-neutral factors, such as . . . 
compliance with other statutory man- dates”); id. at 1019-20 
(discussing early EEOC guidance to this effect). The ADA 
should not be turned into a sinkhole for pregnant workers. 
The lower court’s reasoning, which was troubling under the 
original ADA, is even more so after the 2008 Amendments 
(“ADAAA”), which amended the ADA to require 
accommodation of a wider range of disabilities than under 
court interpretations of the original ADA. 42 U.S.C. 
§12101(2)(A) (2012); see also EEOC Guidance, supra, at 15 
(“Congress made clear in the [ADAAA] that the question of 
whether an individual’s impairment is a covered disability should 
not demand extensive analysis and that the definition of 
disability should be construed in favor of broad coverage.”). 
The ADAAA and its regulations now require reasonable 
accommodations for a broad range of impairments, including 
those that substantially limit a person’s ability to lift, walk, 
stand or bend, even if such limitations are temporary in 
duration. See 42 U.S.C. §12101(2)(A) (2012) (identifying major 
life activities for which substantial  impairment would qualify 
an individual for coverage); 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(i) & (j)(ix) (2012) 
(explaining the standard for impairment under the Amendments 
and stating that “[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or 
expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially 
limiting  within  the  meaning  of  this  section”); 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1630 app. (2012) (similar). 
The ADAAA’s expansion of the class of workers entitled to 
accommodations should, by virtue of the baseline set in the 
PDA, raise the floor for pregnant workers with a similar 
ability or inability to work. See EEOC Guidance, supra, at 3 
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n.11 (“The expanded definition of ‘disability’ under the ADA also 
may affect the PDA requirement that pregnant workers with 
limitations be treated the same as employees who are not 
pregnant but who are similar in their ability or inability to 
work by expanding the number of non- pregnant employees 
who could serve as comparators where disparate treatment 
under the PDA is alleged.”). If the ADAAA requires 
accommodation, for example, for a worker with temporary lower 
back pain, a pregnant worker with a similar limitation should 
receive the same accommodation. The court below, however, 
wrongly concluded that workplace accommodations required 
by the ADA are not appropriate comparison points for the 
treatment of pregnant workers under the PDA. 
If upheld, the lower court’s ruling would give the ADAAA 
the “perverse effect of decreasing employers’ obligations to 
pregnant employees by reducing significantly the pool of 
potential comparators considered under a PDA claim.” Widiss, 
Gilbert Redux, supra, at 964-65; see also EEOC Guidance, supra, 
at 8 (comparing the kinds of disabling conditions now requiring 
reasonable accommodation under the ADAAA to similar effects 
on work resulting from pregnancy). A law designed to help one 
set of workers with disabilities would then have the shocking and 
unintended effect of nullifying the Second Clause of the PDA. 
There is nothing in the original or amended ADA to support 
this interpretation, and this Court has repeatedly 
admonished that legislative repeals by implication are strongly 
disfavored. See Cook County v. U.S.  ex  rel.  Chandler,  538  
U.S.  119,  132  (2003); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 416 
(1994); Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); 
see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“ .  .  .  
when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of 
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to 
the contrary, to regard each as effective.”). This is all the more 
true since the two statutes share a common purpose: ensuring 
that employees with health conditions are not unreasonably 
excluded from the workplace. 
The lower court’s confusion in handling the intersection of 
the PDA and the ADA stems in part from its incorrect 
assumption that the temporary nature of pregnancy makes it 
incomparable to lasting disabilities. Pet. App. 27a. However, 
nothing in the PDA makes the temporary duration of pregnancy 
necessarily incommensurate with such conditions. The similarity 
that counts is the effect on an employee’s ability to work. See 
Brake & Grossman, supra, at 96-97 (explaining references to 
“temporary” disabilities in the PDA’s legislative history). For 
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example, an employer may violate the PDA by permitting an 
employee with type 2 diabetes but not a pregnant employee to 
take frequent snack breaks, even though pregnancy is temporary 
and type 2 diabetes is not. The critical inquiry is whether the 
employer treated pregnancy less favorably than it treats a non- 
pregnant worker with a condition having a similar effect on 
work. 
 
IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH MAKES 
THE PDS AN INEFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR WOMEN IN 
NEED OF ITS PROTECTION 
 
An undeservedly narrow reading of the PDA will have a 
particularly adverse impact on women who most need its 
protection: women in non-traditional occupations and low-
wage working women.4  
 The discriminatory denial of accommodations to pregnant 
workers impedes sex integration of the labor market, relegating 
women to low-wage, female-dominated jobs with little security. 
 Many jobs remain heavily segregated by sex. Women 
already  face substantial  obstacles  to traditionally male-
dominated jobs, see Ariane Hegewisch & Heidi Hartmann, 
Occupational Segregation and the Gender Wage Gap: A Job 
Half Done, Institute For Women’s Policy Research at 4-6 (Jan. 
2014) (noting that “some of the most common occupations for 
either women or men” remain highly segregated). Jobs 
traditionally held by women are generally low paying. See U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the 
Current Population Survey (2014) (noting that traditionally 
male-dominated jobs pay significantly higher wages than 
occupations with a predominantly female workforce); U.S. 
Census Bureau, American Community Survey (2012) (compar- 
ing, for example, median earnings in male-dominated protective 
services occupation of $48,836 with median earnings in female-
dominated personal care occupation of $23,141). Thus, 
working in traditionally male dominated jobs offers women, 
particularly women lacking advanced degrees, a rare avenue to 
middle class earnings. The inability to retain a non-traditional 
job due to non-accommodation of pregnancy is thus a particularly 
grave loss to working class women who have few other 
opportunities to earn a living wage for themselves and their 
families. 
 The likelihood of conflicts between pregnancy and work, 
however, is particularly pronounced in traditionally male-
dominated jobs. For example, women in non-traditional 
DO NOT DELETE 5/19/15  10:55 AM 
No. 1] Introduction Amici Curiae Brief in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 101 
occupations are particularly susceptible to exposure to 
hazardous substances such as chemicals, gas, dust, fumes, or 
radiation. See Grossman & Thomas, supra, at 19 (2009) (citing 
studies). Pregnant firefighters may face exposure to toxins 
contained in fire smoke, including carbon monoxide, benzene 
and other irritant and asphyxiate gasses with a potentially 
negative impact on fetal health. See Melissa A. McDiarmid et al., 
Reproductive Hazards of Fire Fighting II: Chemical Hazards, 
19 Am. J. of Industrial Medicine 447, 451-62 (1991). Non-
traditional occupations are also more likely to require 
strenuous physical activity, some of which may be 
contraindicated for certain phases of pregnancy. For example, 
a seven-months-pregnant police officer may find it challenging 
to pursue a suspect in a foot chase. See Karen J. Kruger, 
Pregnancy and Policing: Are They Compatible? Pushing the 
Legal Limits on Behalf of Equal Employment Opportunities, 22 
Wisc. Women’s L.J. 61, 70 (2006). Non-traditional occupations 
also frequently involve work conditions that can interfere with 
pregnancy, such as irregular hours or night shifts. See Clair 
Infante-Rivard et al., Pregnancy Loss and Work Schedule During 
Pregnancy, 4 Epidemiology 73 (1993) (concluding that the risk of 
preterm delivery is more than twice as high among women who 
work night shifts relative to women on fixed day schedules). 
Given these constraints, lack of pregnancy-related 
accommodations can significantly erode women’s ability to 
both obtain and retain higher-wage, male-dominated jobs. 
Beyond facing a higher risk of conflict between pregnancy  
and  work,  women  in  non-traditional occupations are also 
especially vulnerable to pregnancy discrimination. Although 
several studies have found stereotyping and bias against 
pregnant employees and applicants, see, e.g., Jane A. Halpert 
et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in Performance 
Appraisals, 14 J. Org’l Behav. 649 (1993) (finding substantial 
negative stereotyping against pregnant workers, resulting in 
significantly more negative performance appraisals of pregnant 
workers, especially by male reviewers); Michelle Hebl et al., 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
4 As used here, the term “non-traditional occupations” encompasses all occupations 
where one sex constitutes more than 75 percent of the labor force. See Women’s 
Bureau, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Nontraditional Occupations of Employed Women in 2010, at 
1 n.1 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/ wb/stats/NontraJobs_2010.htm. 
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Hostile and Benevolent Reactions Toward Pregnant Women: 
Complementary Interpersonal Punishments and Rewards That 
Maintain Traditional Roles, 92 J. of Applied Pscyh. 1499, 
1507 (2007) (finding hostile re- actions to pregnant job 
applicants despite benevolent reactions to pregnant customers), 
such negative reactions are even stronger when pregnant 
applicants pursue jobs traditionally held by men. See Hebl, 
supra. Women who enter non-traditional fields are more 
likely to encounter entrenched institutional sexism stemming 
from doubts about their professional competence. For instance, 
women who enter law enforcement “face tremendous 
difficulties” because their male colleagues “doubt that women 
are equal to men in performing job skills, fear that women 
cannot do ‘real’ police work, and have concerns about wom- 
en’s ‘emotional fitness.’ “ Kruger,  supra, at 67; cf. Corina 
Schulze, Institutionalized Masculinity in US Police 
Departments: How Maternity Leave Policies (or Lack Thereof) 
Affect Women in Policing, 23 Crim. J. Stud. 177, 179-180 (2010) 
(discussing ways in which the police  departments’  “masculine  
value  system” contributes to the underrepresentation of 
women in those departments). Pregnancy heightens these 
concerns, increasing women’s risk of being forced out and 
making pregnancy-related accommodations both rare and vital 
to the women in these jobs.5 It is important to remember that 
claims under the Second Clause arise only when an employer 
accommodates other physical limitations or injuries but 
refuses to provide the same level of support to pregnancy. But if 
an employer makes a light-duty position available for a worker 
with an injured back, the employer should also be able to 
make a light-duty position available for a pregnant employee 
with back pain or a lifting restriction. 
Regardless of the type of occupation, the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the PDA is especially harmful to low-income 
women, the group Congress was particularly concerned with 
when it passed the PDA. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 3 
(1978) (noting that “the assumption that women will become 
pregnant and leave the labor force . . . is at the root of the 
discriminatory practices which keep women in low- paying and 
dead-end jobs”). 
Women in low-wage jobs remain highly vulnerable to the 
harms of non-accommodation. First, like women in non-
traditional occupations, women in low- wage jobs are more likely 
to experience conflicts between pregnancy and work because 
they work in physically demanding jobs or highly regimented 
workplaces. See Grossman, supra, at 578-83. Second, low-wage 
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women are less likely to be granted even minor and costless 
accommodations and thus more likely to be forced out because 
of these conflicts. See Stephanie Bornstein, Poor, Pregnant, and 
Fired: Caregiver Discrimination Against Low-Wage Workers, 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law Center for 
Worklife Law (2011), at 2, available at 
http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/PoorPregnantAndFired.pdf (concluding 
that many pregnant low-wage workers are “fired on the spot 
or immediately after announcing a pregnancy, . . . banned from 
certain positions no matter what their individual capabilities to  
do  the job, and . . . refused even small, cost-effective adjust- 
ments that would allow them to continue with work throughout 
their pregnancies”); Paula McDonald et al., Expecting the 
Worst: Circumstances Surrounding Pregnancy Discrimination 
at Work and Progress to Formal Redress, 39 Indus. Rel. J. 
229, 237 (2008) (study finding that most cases of pregnancy 
discrimination occurred in low-wage occupations); cf. Wise- 
man v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48020, at 
*1 (D. Kan. July 21, 2009) (store policy barred pregnant 
fitting room monitor from carrying a water bottle at work 
despite recommendation from doctor). Moreover, given rigid 
work schedules with parsimonious leave policies, low-wage 
workers find it challenging to take time off for necessary medical 
appointments.  See  Bornstein,  supra,  at  6  (noting that “less than 
one-third of working parents with incomes under $28,000 ha[ve] 
access to flexible workplace scheduling”); see also Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in the United States – March 
2014 (July 25, 2014), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf (noting that only 21 
percent of workers in the bottom 10 percent of wage-earners have 
access to paid sick days). Accordingly, court interpretations that 
minimize protections of the PDA exacerbate already difficult 





5 PDA-related litigation indeed suggests that conflicts tend to arise with particular 
frequency in non-traditional occupations. See e.g. Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 
637 (6th Cir. 2006) (delivery truck driver); Lehmuller v. Incorporated Village of Sag 
Harbor, 944 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (police officer); Dimino  v.  New  York  City  
Transit  Auth.,  64  F. Supp. 2d  136 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (transit police officer); Spees v. 
James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2010) (welder). 
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The plight of a low-income woman segregated out of a higher-
wage, male-dominated job into the equally strenuous low-wage 
one based on her reproductive capacity is far from novel. As 
far back as a century ago, pregnancy was the common basis for “ 
‘protecting’ female employees  out of  jobs desirable  to 
males.” Deborah L. Rhode, Speaking of Sex: The Denial of 
Gender Inequality 34 (1997). Giving the PDA its due is not just 
a matter of doing justice to the plain language of the statute. It 
is vital to putting an end to the longstanding unjust treatment 
of working women, particularly ones who perform “men’s 




 For the foregoing reasons, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling 
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Appendix A 
The Amici have substantial expertise in employ- ment 
discrimination law and issues relating to wom- en’s workplace  
equality. Their  expertise thus bears directly on the issues 
before the Court in this case. These Amici are listed below. 
For professors, their institutional affiliations are listed for 
identification purposes only. 
 
Organizations 
Legal Momentum  (formerly NOW Legal Defense and 
Education Fund) has been at the national fore- front of the 
movement to advance women’s rights for more than forty years. 
As part of this work, Legal Momentum has particularly 
focused on eliminating unjust barriers to women’s economic 
security, such as pregnancy discrimination. To combat pregnancy 
discrimination, Legal Momentum advocates through the legal 
system and in cooperation with government agencies and policy 
makers. In addition, Legal Momentum routinely represents 
women working in nontraditional or low-wage jobs who have 
been denied light duty positions while pregnant. It is Legal 
Momentum’s position that interpreting the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act to require employers to accommodate 
pregnant workers when  such  accommodations are available to 
other workers is vital to eradicating pregnancy-based workplace 
discrimination. 
Equal Rights Advocates (ERA) is a national women’s 
advocacy organization based in San Francisco, California. 
Founded in 1974, ERA’s mission is to protect and expand 
economic and educational access and opportunities for women 
and girls. ERA employs a three-pronged approach to achieving 
its mission: public education, policy advocacy, and litigation. 
ERA is committed to assisting working women who face 
myriad workplace challenges. In furtherance of that objective, 
ERA has been involved in historic impact litigation, including 
two of the first pregnancy dis- crimination cases, Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and Richmond Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Berg, 434 U.S. 158 (1977), as well as the more recent 
AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009). ERA’s nation- 
wide multi-lingual hotline serves hundreds of women every year 
and helps them navigate these challenges. Calls from workers 
facing pregnancy discrimination are on the rise, and ERA has a 
strong interest in ensuring that women are adequately protected 
by a fair application of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(PDA) by courts. 
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The Maurice and Jane Sugar Law Center for Economic 
and Social Justice is a national non- profit law center 
extensively engaged in labor and employment law litigation, 
including gender and pregnancy discrimination. The Sugar 
Law Center is deeply interested in this case because its outcome 
affects the right of thousands of women workers employed in 
traditionally male workplaces and the ongoing harms 
occurring to women workers who become pregnant while 
working. The judgment of amici is based on over 15 years 
experience in public interest advocacy and representation on 
behalf of workers before administrative agencies and federal 
and state courts throughout the country. Our experience 
includes one of the first cases in the Midwest directly 
confronting the issues arising in this case, and is based on a 
history and mission of public advocacy that has included 
contacts with state and local elected officials who have sought 
understanding of the issues before the court in the present 
matter. 
Public Justice, P.C. (Public Justice) is a national public 
interest law firm dedicated to pursuing justice for the victims of 
corporate, governmental, and individual wrongdoing. It works 
to advance civil rights and civil liberties, employees’ rights, 
consumers’ and victims’ rights, environmental protection, access 
to justice, and the protection of the poor and the power- less. 
Public Justice has prosecuted a wide range of gender 
discrimination and workers’ rights cases. It is devoted to 
ensuring that women and men are treated equally, that pregnant 
and non-pregnant workers are treated equally on the basis of 
their ability to work, and that the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act is interpreted to mean what it says. 
The Union for Reform Judaism (URJ) including 900 
congregations in North America encompassing 
1.3 million Reform Jews, the Central Conference of 
American Rabbis (CCAR), whose membership includes more 
than 2000 Reform rabbis, and the Women of Reform Judaism 
that represents more than 65,000 women in nearly 500 women’s 
groups in North America and around the world, come to this 
issue out of a longtime commitment to asserting the principle, 
and furthering the practice, of the full equality of women on 
every level of life. 
The Women’s Law Project (WLP) is a non-profit public 
interest law firm with offices in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. Founded in 1974, the WLP is dedicated to 
improving the legal and economic status of women and their 
families through litigation, public policy initiatives, public 
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education, and individual counseling. Throughout its history, 
the WLP has worked to eliminate sex discrimination by 
bringing and supporting litigation challenging discriminatory 
practices prohibited by  federal  civil rights laws. WLP assists 
women who have been victims of pregnancy discrimination in 
employment through its telephone counseling service and 
through direct legal representation. The WLP has a strong 
interest in the proper application of the Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy 
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